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2. Unilateral Refusals to License in the 
US1 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis and 
Mark A. Lemley 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Most antitrust claims relating to intellectual property involve challenges to 
agreements, licensing practices or affirmative conduct involving the use or 
disposition of the intellectual property rights or the products they cover. But 
sometimes an antitrust claim centers on an intellectual property owner’s 
refusal to use or license an intellectual property right, perhaps coupled with 
efforts to enforce the intellectual property right against infringers.2 The 
allegation may be that the intellectual property right is so essential to 
competition that it must be licensed across the board, or that a refusal to 
license it to one particular party was discriminatory, or that in context a 
refusal to license helped a monopolist to acquire or maintain market power. 
Claims based on a unilateral refusal to license – the subject of this 
chapter – present important issues at the center of the tension between 
antitrust and intellectual property. The antitrust and intellectual property laws 
are not necessarily in conflict. For the most part they serve complementary 
goals, though each must limit the scope of the other. Unilateral refusal to 
license cases, however, cut to the heart of the intellectual property owner’s 
right to exclude others from practicing the intellectual property.3 As such, 
efforts to invoke antitrust law in this context deserve special scrutiny. 
Section II reviews the basic principles relating to unilateral refusals to 
license intellectual property rights. Section III discusses in detail the various 
sets of circumstances in which antitrust plaintiffs argue for exceptions to 
those basic rules. Section IV distinguishes unilateral from concerted and 
conditional refusals to deal.  
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II. BASIC PRINCIPLE: NO GENERAL DUTY TO 
LICENSE 
A. No Duty to Use IP At All4 
The starting point for understanding the unilateral refusal to license cases is 
the fundamental principle that an intellectual property owner has no 
obligation to use its right at all. In patent cases, this principle was established 
in the 1908 Supreme Court decision of Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern 
Paper Bag.5 In that case, Eastern owned a patent describing a machine for 
making ‘self-opening’ paper bags. Eastern never used the machine described 
in the patent, and did not license it to others. When it sued Continental for 
infringing the patent, Continental defended on the ground that it would be 
inequitable to enforce the patent because Eastern wasn’t using the patented 
machine, and was merely trying to use the patent to suppress competition. 
The district court found that ‘complainant stands in the common class of 
manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting 
their general industries and shutting out competitors.’6 While the Supreme 
Court accepted this explanation, it nonetheless reversed. The court noted that 
‘such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right 
conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use 
or not use it, without question of motive.’7 
Congress has since codified the patent owner’s right to refuse to use the 
patent. Section 271(d)(4) provides that a patent owner cannot be deemed 
guilty of misuse by virtue of its refusal to use or license the patent.8 
Copyright and trade secret laws similarly condone non-use and non-
disclosure of the rights in question. Indeed, in trade secrecy the effective 
concealment of the secret is a prerequisite to protection, and courts discuss 
licensing in terms of whether licensing is inconsistent with continued 
protection.9 Compelled licensing would therefore be inconsistent with trade 
secret protection. Copyright owners have since 1976 been entitled to protect 
both published and unpublished works, and indeed copyright protection is 
somewhat more powerful for unpublished works due to the copyright owner’s 
stronger interest in preventing use of the work.10 Trademark law, by contrast, 
does require use in commerce as a prerequisite for protection. But the use in 
question must be made by (or inure to the benefit of) the trademark owner 
itself; trademark law strictly regulates efforts to license marks to third parties.  
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B. Right to Enforce IP; No General Compulsory Licensing 
Concomitant with the general right to refuse to use an intellectual property 
right is the right to enforce that intellectual property right against infringing 
use by others. A ‘right’ to refrain from using intellectual property would be a 
hollow thing indeed if the intellectual property owner could not prevent 
others from infringing the right. Since intellectual property laws merely 
confer the right to exclude others from doing certain things, they can only be 
enforced by resort to the courts. As the Court put it in Continental Paper Bag, 
‘the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its 
violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law 
confers upon the patentee.’11 Copyright decisions have similarly confirmed 
that copyright owners may refuse to license their rights, and may enforce 
those rights by lawsuit.12 
It is periodically suggested, however, that even if an intellectual property 
owner can enforce an unused right, the enforcement of that right ought to be 
limited to a right to recover damages rather than an entitlement to injunctive 
relief. Such an approach would effectively constitute a judicially-created 
compulsory licensing scheme. Instead of a property rule, to which intellectual 
property owners are normally entitled,13 the court would be substituting a 
liability rule. A few courts have refused to grant injunctions in the patent 
context where inventions related to public health or safety are at issue. For 
example, in Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge,14 the patentee owned a patent for 
the treatment of raw sewage. It successfully sued a sewage treatment plant for 
infringement. The court refused to grant an injunction, however, because 
doing so would force the public to put up with untreated sewage. The 
patentee was instead relegated to a damages remedy.15 The Supreme Court 
has also suggested in the copyright context that injunctive relief may not 
always be appropriate against infringers who have nonetheless contributed 
substantial new material to an infringing work.16  
These cases are small exceptions to a broad rule, however. The intellectual 
property laws contain no general provision for compulsory working or 
licensing of intellectual property rights. While courts have occasionally 
refused to enjoin infringing uses where some sort of overriding public interest 
was at stake, they have generally done so on the basis of intellectual property 
rather than antitrust principles. Antitrust law does not itself impose an 
obligation to use or license intellectual property rights, such that a refusal to 
use or license the right would violate the antitrust laws. Further, such an 
obligation would – unlike the vast majority of the antitrust rules we discuss in 
this text – conflict directly with the rights granted to an intellectual property 
owner by the intellectual property laws. Thus, as a general rule there is no 
antitrust obligation either to use or license a patent.17 
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C. Right to Refuse to Deal with Specific Customers 
A variant of the argument that an intellectual property owner may be 
compelled to use or license its right is the argument that the intellectual 
property owner cannot discriminate in the grant of licenses once it does make 
them available. This is a common species of antitrust complaint; plaintiffs 
frequently argue that they have been unfairly disadvantaged because their 
competitor got a license and they didn’t, or because their competitor got a 
license on more favorable terms. In this section, we deal only with claims of 
unilateral refusals to license.18  
Antitrust law is generally hostile to such claims, even where intellectual 
property rights are not at issue. The Court’s repeated invocation of the rule 
that the antitrust laws ‘protect competition, not competitors’19 seems 
applicable here. Thus, in Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union 
Telegraph,20 Judge Posner noted that ‘it is clear that a firm with lawful 
monopoly power has no general duty to help its competitors, whether by 
holding a price umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling its 
competitive punches.’21 An antitrust violation is even less likely where the 
intellectual property owner does not compete directly with the disfavored 
licensee; absent some showing of monopoly leveraging it is not clear what 
incentive the intellectual property owner would have to try to eliminate 
competition in the downstream market. 
Where a license has been granted and is later revoked, some courts have 
seen the issue differently, suggesting some sort of legal obligation to continue 
an existing business relationship.22 Even then, imposing such an obligation is 
unusual. Olympia Leasing itself rejected an obligation to continue dealing 
with a competitor.23 In the intellectual property context, Miller Insituform v. 
Insituform of North America held that an exclusive patent licensee did not 
violate the antitrust laws when it terminated a sublicense to the plaintiff and 
instead entered the market itself.24 The court held that by terminating the 
license the exclusive licensee ‘merely exercised his power to exclude others 
from using the Insituform process, as was its right’ under the patent laws.25 
Where intellectual property licenses are at issue, there are even stronger 
policy reasons than normal not to impose a nondiscrimination obligation in 
the choice of licensees. The purpose of intellectual property rights is to 
encourage innovation by granting their owner a reward better than it could 
obtain in a competitive market. Sometimes that reward is maximized if the 
intellectual property owner uses the right itself and does not license it to 
others. But it may be rational for intellectual property owners to license their 
rights to others for a number of reasons. They may be ill-equipped to make 
the protected product; they may want a revenue stream without having to 
invest in producing and selling the product; they may wish to reserve one 
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geographic or product market to themselves, while allowing others to exploit 
the intellectual property right elsewhere; or they may simply feel that broad 
dissemination of their product will redound to their benefit (for example, 
because there is value in having their product become an industry standard).  
Economic theory encourages licensing, because it allows the market to 
transfer the intellectual property right to the most productive user of that 
right.26 But efficient licenses will often be exclusive in nature, or at least 
restricted in geographic scope, field of use, or extent or duration of use. If an 
intellectual property owner who once licenses a right is thereafter compelled 
to make licenses available to all comers on substantially equal terms, the 
likely effect will be to discourage licensing altogether. Certainly the effect 
would be to prohibit exclusive licensing, which is often the most efficient 
means of extracting value from an intellectual property right.27  
As a result, some courts have proposed a general rule: ‘A patent holder 
who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by 
refusing to license the patent to others.’28 This proposed per se rule of legality 
is somewhat stronger than the rule in non-intellectual property cases. Outside 
the intellectual property context, unilateral refusals to deal with specific 
customers on nondiscriminatory terms are generally illegal only if the subject 
of the refusal is an ‘essential facility’. We discuss the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine to intellectual property, and the more general 
question of whether a unilateral refusal to license intellectual property can 
ever violate the antitrust laws, in more detail below.29 
D. Policy Basis; Practical Problems with Contrary Rule 
The fundamental basis for permitting most unilateral refusals to use or license 
an intellectual property right should be clear from the preceding sections. 
Unlike the Walker Process or sham litigation cases,30 the cases we are 
considering involve a valid right infringed by others. Intellectual property law 
generally permits owners to enforce their rights by means of an injunction, 
and does not compel them to use or license those rights to others. For antitrust 
law to reach a contrary conclusion would require it to make illegal precisely 
the same conduct that the intellectual property laws explicitly authorize. 
Doing so would significantly reduce the innovation incentive intellectual 
property provides, not only to those who refuse to use the invention at all, but 
also to those who wish to license their rights only under certain conditions. 
The practical problems with a compulsory working or licensing scheme 
further counsel against such a rule. In the first place, it is worth noting that 
many – perhaps a majority – of patented inventions are simply impractical to 
use. The invention may cost too much to implement, or the market may not 
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exist for it. A rule that required all patents to be offered for license would 
simply result in wasted expenditures in many cases. It would also prevent a 
patentee from choosing to exploit only one of many competitive technologies 
it has developed, and therefore might have the effect of punishing innovators 
who work along parallel lines.31 Alternatively, should antitrust law seek to 
compel the licensing only of truly valuable technologies, it would be put to 
the nearly impossible task of defining and then determining which intellectual 
property rights should fit into that category.32 Similarly, if the obligation is 
that the patentee work its invention, someone will have to determine whether 
the patentee is satisfying that requirement by evaluating the patentee’s 
products, by resolving disputes over uses in different sub-fields, and so on. 
Even more problematic is that a court that imposed a duty to license must 
engage in price regulation of the license. A rule that requires licensing but 
lets the licensor set the price is easily evaded by the licensor setting an 
exorbitant royalty. So any scheme that requires the intellectual property 
owner to license its rights must also include some (presumably judicial, but 
perhaps administrative) mechanism for pricing those rights. Such a system 
should in turn probably have continuing oversight over the rates charged, 
since their reasonableness may change over time.33 The specter of ongoing 
judicial intervention in product pricing goes a long way towards explaining 
why antitrust law avoids compelling licenses altogether in most 
circumstances. 
III. CIRCUMSTANCES ALLEGED TO GIVE RISE TO A 
DUTY TO LICENSE 
As noted in the previous section, there is no general duty under either the 
intellectual property or antitrust laws to use or license an intellectual property 
right. Most of the cases that are litigated in this area therefore allege specific 
factual circumstances that might give rise to an exception to this general rule. 
Generally speaking, exceptions to the rule are rare, and normally involve 
circumstances in which an intellectual property owner has sought to expand 
the scope of its right beyond what the intellectual property laws grant it. In 
this section, we consider the claims most commonly made for exceptional 
duties to license. 
A. Market Power Prerequisite 
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that we are dealing in this chapter only 
with purely unilateral refusals to deal.34 Unilateral conduct is actionable if at 
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all under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, where it helps a party to acquire or 
maintain monopoly power. Thus, in each of the factual circumstances 
discussed here, proof that the defendant has or is likely to obtain monopoly 
power is a necessary prerequisite to an antitrust claim. In the absence of 
monopoly power, there is no set of circumstances in which a truly unilateral 
refusal to license can violate the antitrust laws.35 Even Section 2 claims based 
on conduct also addressed in other antitrust statutes, such as tying or 
exclusive dealing, require proof of market power if they are brought as 
challenges to unilateral conduct under Section 2. 
Similarly, because unilateral refusals to deal will be illegal if at all under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the other attributes of the rule of reason must 
be satisfied. In particular, antitrust defendants should have the opportunity to 
demonstrate procompetitive justifications for their conduct. Proof that a 
unilateral refusal to license was on net pro- rather than anticompetitive should 
dispose of a claim under the rule of reason.36 
B. Invalid Intellectual Property Rights 
It is also important to emphasize that this chapter deals only with refusals to 
license valid intellectual property rights. Similarly, to the extent it discusses 
liability for bringing an infringement lawsuit, we deal here only with 
situations where the infringement claim is supported by probable cause. 
Many Section 2 claims have at their heart the argument that the intellectual 
property in question was obtained by fraud, is invalid, or is not infringed, and 
the intellectual property owner is knowingly enforcing this invalid right in 
order to obtain a competitive advantage.37 
C. Essential Facilities Doctrine38 
1. Background; criticism of doctrine 
One possible antitrust approach to refusals to use or license an intellectual 
property right does not focus on conduct at all. Instead, the argument is that 
certain monopolies inherently give rise to a duty to deal fairly with all 
comers. Courts sometimes hold that a monopolist has a duty to deal with 
competitors, or at least to continue a relationship once it has begun. Under 
this doctrine, the monopoly owner of an ‘essential facility’ for competition 
may be forced to give access to that facility to competitors on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms. The essential facilities doctrine is unique in that a 
monopolist’s status (as the owner of the facility and a competitor in the 
market that relies on the facility) rather than any affirmative conduct 
determines liability.39 
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The essential facilities doctrine grew out of a number of cases in which a 
vertically integrated company (or a group of them) had exclusive control over 
some facility, and used that control to gain an advantage over competitors in 
an adjacent or downstream market. Most of the canonical cases have this 
basic structure. Thus, in Terminal Railroad, a group of railroads jointly 
owned a key bridge over the Mississippi River and accompanying rail yard, 
and refused to give competing railroads use of the facilities.40 In Otter Tail, 
the public utility that owned all the transmission lines into a municipality 
refused to allow the municipality to ‘wheel’ power over those lines from 
outside plants, because the utility itself wanted to provide power to the 
municipality.41 And in MCI v. AT&T, the pre-breakup Bell System refused to 
permit MCI to connect its long distance calls to the Bell System’s local phone 
exchanges.42 In each of these cases, the defendant owned a facility that could 
not feasibly be duplicated, and also participated in a competitive downstream 
market that required access to the facility. By denying access to the facility, 
the defendant either eliminated its downstream competitors or imposed 
significant costs on them.43 
In MCI, the court set out a four-part test for an essential facilities claim: 
1. control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
2. a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the 
essential facility; 
3. the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and  
4. the feasibility of providing the facility.44 
If such a claim is made out, the defendant will be obligated to provide access 
to the facility on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. 
Under this test, the defendant must be a monopolist, and the facility must 
be ‘essential’ in the sense that the competitor needs access to it in order to 
compete. An essential facility will therefore normally be an input into the 
competitive market – some component that must be used in providing the 
competitive product or service. The need must be substantial, however – 
inconvenience or cost increase resulting from unavailability should not 
suffice.45 The court’s test also offers a defense of legitimate business 
justification, by permitting the defendant to show that it wasn’t feasible to 
provide access to the facility. The ‘reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms’ 
language also limits the defendant’s obligation in circumstances where 
particular plaintiffs cannot afford to pay, aren’t willing to pay a reasonable 
price, or the like.46 
While the court doesn’t discuss it directly, it seems important to add that 
withholding an essential facility is illegal only if it has the effect of 
foreclosing competition in the downstream market, and therefore of helping 
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the defendant to acquire or maintain a monopoly in that market. Otter Tail 
and MCI both had such a characteristic; arguably so did Aspen.47 In the 
absence of such a market effect, condemning a truly unilateral refusal to deal 
could open the door to all sorts of claims in which competition is not really at 
stake. 
The essential facilities doctrine as a whole has come in for serious 
criticism. In its most recent treatment of the issue, the Supreme Court 
engaged in a bit of revisionist history, distancing itself from the doctrine and 
claiming that the Court had ‘never recognized such a doctrine’.48 Many 
prominent antitrust scholars have argued that the doctrine should be abolished 
outright.49 Others who favor the continued existence of the doctrine 
nonetheless concede that it is properly applied only in rare cases.50  
2. Intellectual property itself as essential facility 
Regardless of the merits of the essential facilities doctrine in general, its 
application to intellectual property cases is particularly problematic. 
Generally speaking an intellectual property owner has the right unilaterally to 
decide not to use or license its intellectual property. Imposing a duty to deal 
in some cases threatens to undermine this basic principle. As a result, we are 
aware of no case in which a US court has held that an intellectual property 
right was itself an essential facility that must be licensed on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms.51 
Two recent cases involve claims that intellectual property rights are 
essential facilities. In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,52 Intergraph sued Intel 
after Intel cut off its supply of microprocessors and proprietary information. 
Intergraph, which makes computer workstations using Intel architecture and 
Intel microprocessors, had threatened to sue Intel’s customers for violating 
Intergraph patents, an act that triggered Intel’s obligation to defend those 
customers. In response, Intel threatened to stop supplying Intergraph with 
chips or technical assistance unless Intergraph dropped its patent suit. When 
Intergraph ultimately sued Intel for patent infringement, it also made a variety 
of antitrust claims based on Intel’s efforts to cut off the flow of technology to 
Intergraph.53 
Among Intergraph’s claims was an essential facilities argument. Intergraph 
argued that access to Intel’s chips and technical know-how was vital to its 
business, and that Intel should be compelled to license its patents and trade 
secrets to Intergraph on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. The district 
court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that Intel’s intellectual 
property rights related to its chip architecture was indeed an essential 
facility.54  
The Federal Circuit reversed.55 On the essential facilities issue, the court 
reviewed the doctrine in detail and concluded that an essential facilities claim 
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could not be made out unless the owner of the essential facility and the 
antitrust plaintiff competed in a market that required access to the facility. 
The court noted that the gravamen of an essential facilities claim has always 
been an attempt to use control of such a facility to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage in a downstream market in which the defendant and the plaintiff 
competed.56 Because it held that Intergraph and Intel did not compete at all, 
the court concluded that Intergraph could not possibly make out an essential 
facilities claim.57 
In Aldridge v. Microsoft Corp.,58 the plaintiff was the seller of a disk 
caching program. When Microsoft preempted the plaintiff’s market by 
including a competing disk caching function in the new version of its 
computer operating system, Aldridge sued, claiming that Microsoft had 
violated the antitrust laws. Aldridge argued that Windows 95 was an essential 
facility because if a program didn’t run on Windows 95, it was effectively 
unavailable to the overwhelming majority of users.59 Aldridge argued that its 
disk caching program, which had run on previous Microsoft operating 
systems, was disabled on Windows 95, and that as a result it was denied 
access to the facility by Microsoft, a company itself entering the disk caching 
business. The court restated the four-part test discussed in MCI, adding the 
requirement that ‘the defendant has the type of control over the facility that is 
forbidden by the Sherman Act.’60 The court held that Aldridge failed to meet 
several elements of the test. First, it held that the facility in question was not 
essential, a conclusion we discuss below. Second, it noted that the essential 
facilities doctrine has only been applied in cases where there is either a 
natural monopoly or a government-supported one.61 Microsoft’s operating 
system was neither.62 
In both Intergraph and Aldridge, the plaintiff’s claims seemed to founder 
primarily on the fact that they were seeking to continue privileged access that 
they had received in the past, not a level of access that could be provided to 
everyone. Thus, while the continuation of this access was ‘essential’ to the 
plaintiff’s business model in both cases, it did not qualify as an essential 
facility under the antitrust laws. As the court in Aldridge put it, ‘a facility is 
essential under the antitrust laws only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s 
individual competitive viability and the viability of the market in general.’63 
The court rejected the idea that even monopolists must pre-disclose 
information about their own products so that others can build compatible 
products.64 
In neither case did the court expressly hold that a facility protected by 
intellectual property rights could never be essential. In Intergraph, the 
Federal Circuit didn’t focus on the intellectual property aspects of the case at 
all, even though Intel’s provision of information included both its patented 
architecture and trade secrets. Aldridge doesn’t discuss the issue directly, but 
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does focus on the problem of innovation. In that case, Microsoft’s exclusion 
of Aldridge’s disk caching program occurred when Microsoft solved 
problems in its previous operating systems that Aldridge had been correcting. 
The court warned against punishing Microsoft for improving its product: 
‘Such a result would inhibit, not promote, competition in the market. The 
antitrust laws do not require a competitor to maintain archaic or outdated 
technology; even monopolists may improve their products.’65 Similarly, in 
rejecting Aldridge’s pre-disclosure argument, the court noted that Microsoft 
‘could lawfully decline to reveal advances in technology.’66 While neither 
passage speaks to intellectual property rights directly, the court clearly seems 
concerned to preserve monopolists’ incentives to innovate. 
One decision suggesting that intellectual property may constitute an 
essential facility is the district court’s decision in BellSouth Advertising v. 
Donnelley Information.67 In that case, BellSouth sued Donnelley for 
copyright infringement after Donnelley copied the organization of its 
telephone ‘yellow pages’. Donnelley counterclaimed on the grounds that the 
Bell yellow pages were an essential facility to which it was entitled to access. 
The district court found that Donnelley did infringe BellSouth’s copyright.68 
Nonetheless, it proceeded to hold that there was a genuine issue of fact for 
trial on the question of whether BellSouth’s copyrighted telephone directory 
was an essential facility to which it had to provide access. The court 
addressed the fact that the ‘facility’ in question was information:  
Although the doctrine of essential facilities has been applied predominantly to 
tangible assets, there is no reason why it could not apply, as in this case, to 
information wrongfully withheld. The effect in both situations is the same: a party 
is prevented from sharing something essential to compete.69 
The court did not discuss the fact that the directory was copyrighted in the 
context of an essential facilities claim. However, since the court had just held 
that the directory was copyrighted, it necessarily must have concluded that a 
copyrighted work could be an essential facility. Indeed, Aldridge cites 
BellSouth for the proposition that the telephone directory can be an essential 
facility because it is copyrighted, since copyright law gives BellSouth 
effective control over access to the facility.70 
While these cases present the issue, none of the courts directly address the 
question of whether an intellectual property right itself – or products 
protected by an intellectual property right – can constitute an essential 
facility. We believe the better view is that an intellectual property right itself 
cannot constitute an essential facility, and that the doctrine should not be 
applied to cases that seek access to an intellectual property right in any but 
the most unusual of circumstances.71  
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The essential facilities doctrine itself is a rare and controversial departure 
from the general principle that even monopolists do not violate the antitrust 
laws unless they engage in anticompetitive conduct that helps them acquire or 
maintain a monopoly. The essential facilities doctrine has been successfully 
applied primarily in cases in which the facility in question is a natural 
monopoly, often regulated, and the owner of that facility uses its monopoly to 
suppress competition in a downstream market.72 Intellectual property, as we 
have seen, is rarely coextensive with a monopoly at all, much less a regulated 
or natural monopoly. Further, to the extent that intellectual property rights 
themselves are thought to create the barriers to competition necessary to 
make a facility essential, that measure of market control is part and parcel of 
the incentives conferred by the intellectual property laws themselves. As the 
Supreme Court explained in the context of a telecommunications company, 
‘compelling . . . firms to share the source of their advantage is in some 
tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the 
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in . . . economically 
beneficial facilities.’73 The risk is even greater where intellectual property 
rights are at stake. 
There are practical problems with such a requirement as well. Almost 
invariably, essential facilities claims involving intellectual property turn out 
to be claims demanding a continuation of privileged access to a monopolist’s 
technology by a competitor who has built a market in goods or services 
complementary to or downstream from that particular technology. Thus, 
Intergraph wants continued access to Intel’s proprietary information, and 
Aldridge wants pre-release access to Microsoft’s applications program 
interfaces.74 To grant such access conflicts directly with the rules of 
intellectual property law, which as we have seen permit the intellectual 
property owner to refuse to license or use its rights at all.75 It requires the 
courts to determine both a reasonable price for the license and fair conditions 
for access by others, and to supervise that access on an ongoing basis.76 And 
it does so without the normal prerequisite: proof that the intellectual property 
owner has sought to expand the scope of the right beyond what the 
intellectual property laws permit.  
Where an essential facilities claim is premised solely on ownership of an 
intellectual property right (the ‘essential’ facility) by a vertically integrated 
monopolist, therefore, we believe the purposes of antitrust law are best served 
by denying such a claim outright.77 As the court in In re Microsoft Corp. 
Antitrust Litigation warned, ‘to require one company to provide its 
intellectual property to a competitor would significantly chill innovation’.78 
In the next section, we consider some limitations on this general principle. 
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3. Intellectual property as incidental to essential facilities claim 
Our conclusion in the prior section that intellectual property itself should not 
constitute an essential facility does not resolve all of the issues, however. 
Obviously, a monopolist can voluntarily agree to license its intellectual 
property rights on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, even though the 
law does not compel it to do so. For example, intellectual property owners 
that are members of standard-setting organizations often commit to licensing 
intellectual property rights covering a standard set by the group to anyone 
who wants to use the standard. Once it has agreed to do so, a monopolist is 
bound to license its intellectual property right just as any other party would 
be. But it is contract rather than antitrust law that compels the company in 
this case. 
A slightly different case, but one that still falls within the rubric of 
voluntary agreements to license, involves nondiscriminatory licensing as a 
condition of merger approval. An example is the license imposed by consent 
decree in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.79 The Federal Trade Commission 
challenged Silicon Graphics’ purchase of software makers Alias and 
Wavefront, arguing that it constituted both horizontal integration (Alias and 
Wavefront were competitors) and vertical integration with Silicon Graphics, 
the largest maker of workstations running entertainment graphics software. 
The Commission entered into a consent decree with Silicon Graphics that 
compelled SGI to license the Alias and Wavefront software to all comers on 
nondiscriminatory terms.80 While Silicon Graphics was ‘compelled’ in some 
sense to license its intellectual property rights, the FTC’s action doesn’t raise 
essential facility concerns. So long as the FTC had legitimate grounds to 
challenge the merger for other antitrust reasons, it was free to settle its 
challenge by imposing reasonable conditions to which Silicon Graphics 
agreed.81 
A third set of cases that should escape the rule of per se legality we 
suggested above has to do with the proper scope of the intellectual property 
right in question. The analysis in the preceding section presumes both that the 
intellectual property right in question is valid, and that what a plaintiff seeks 
to compel is in fact within the legitimate scope of the intellectual property 
right. If that is not the case, the intellectual property owner deserves no 
special protection from the normal operation of the essential facilities 
doctrine. Certainly an invalid intellectual property right should offer no 
immunity, though it is also hard to imagine a set of circumstances in which 
access to such a right would have to be compelled. A more plausible situation 
involves an antitrust claim of access to information that intellectual property 
law does not protect – the ideas in a copyrighted work, for example.82 In such 
a case, the essential facilities claim should be approached as if the intellectual 
property right didn’t exist – that is, intellectual property will not confer any 
26 Antitrust, Patents and Copyright 
 
immunity, but a plaintiff must still prove all the elements necessary for an 
essential facilities claim. Thus, we would disagree with those courts that have 
found a legitimate business justification in the prevention of ‘free riding’ on 
the defendant’s information in the absence of any intellectual property right 
in that information.83 In the absence of intellectual property protection, ‘free 
riding’ on facts and ideas is affirmatively encouraged by intellectual property 
law. A desire to mimic intellectual property protection where the law has 
provided none should not translate into a defense to an otherwise proper 
antitrust claim. 
The most difficult conceptual issue concerns intellectual property rights 
that are incidental to a facility that would be essential even without such a 
right. This issue is most likely to arise in the context of a regulated or natural 
monopoly. For example, the 7th Circuit in MCI v. AT&T held that the local 
lines in the old Bell phone system were an essential facility that Bell had to 
provide to those who competed with it in the market for long-distance 
telephone services.84 Assuming that this conclusion is right as a matter of 
antitrust law, should the outcome have been different if Bell could point to 
patents on its telephone switches?  
Courts dealing with such situations have generally not paid much if any 
attention to the incidental effect of the essential facilities claim on intellectual 
property rights. One example is Associated Press v. United States.85 The 
Associated Press is a joint venture between different newspapers to pool news 
reporting services and stories. The government brought suit, alleging that 
AP’s policy permitting an existing member to ‘blacklist’ a proposed new 
member (usually a local competitor) violated the antitrust laws. The court 
held that the policy was an unreasonable agreement among horizontal 
competitors. While the case is not strictly speaking an essential facilities case, 
it has certain overtones of compelled access on reasonable terms.86 The Court 
made no mention of the fact that AP’s members’ stories were copyrighted, 
and that the effect of the decision was to force AP to share those copyrighted 
works with others admitted to the joint venture. The court’s focus was on 
access to the network itself and the discriminatory effect of AP’s policy. 
While copyright was lurking in the background, the copyrighted stories 
themselves were not the essential facility to which the complainants wanted 
access.87 
On this basis, it seems fair to characterize the law as distinguishing 
between cases in which the intellectual property right itself is the facility to 
which the plaintiff wants access and cases in which intellectual property 
rights exist but are incidental to the control of the facility itself. Only in the 
former case is the per se rule appropriate. Thus, in MCI, MCI presumably 
wanted access to the local telephone distribution lines that ran into each 
consumer’s home. They were not interested in AT&T’s switches in 
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particular, and certainly not in the fact that certain parts of those switches 
may have been patented. Courts do not seem inclined to allow proof of such 
an incidental patent right to preclude an essential facilities claim altogether.88 
One final point is appropriate. Even where the essential facilities doctrine 
does not compel access to a facility protected by an intellectual property 
right, Congress may require such access by means of other regulation. The 
most important example is the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 
Telecommunications Act displaces earlier essential facility cases against 
incumbent telephone companies to the extent that that statute imposes 
interconnection as a statutory requirement independent of the antitrust 
requirement. As one court put it, 
the 1996 Act imposes duties on the ILECs that are not found in the antitrust laws. 
Those duties do not conflict with the antitrust laws either; they are simply more 
specific and far-reaching obligations that Congress believed would accelerate the 
development of competitive markets, consistently with universal service (which, 
we note, competitive markets would not necessarily assure).89 
Thus, the interconnection requirements of the Telecommunications Act are 
independent of the essential facilities doctrine. They do not give rise to an 
antitrust cause of action,90 but neither are they subject to the limited 
protection for intellectual property rights we describe in the previous 
section.91 In Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,92 
the Supreme Court held that the regulatory scheme of the 
Telecommunications Act did not directly preempt antitrust authority. At the 
same time, the Court reversed the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine in that case, noting that an essential facilities claim could not be 
made out where a regulatory statute already compelled access to the facility. 
D. Refusal to License as Facilitation of Monopolization93 
An alternative claim sometimes made with respect to unilateral refusals to 
deal is that the refusal to deal is anticompetitive conduct sufficient to support 
a monopoly acquisition or maintenance claim under Section 2. In one sense 
such a claim is narrower than an essential facilities theory. The plaintiff must 
prove that a specific act – usually refusing to deal with the plaintiff – 
constitutes anticompetitive conduct by a monopolist that contributes to 
monopolization. The remedy may be limited to the specific conduct, and 
therefore may be less sweeping than a general obligation to license all 
comers. Still, the line between the essential facilities doctrine – a law 
compelling dealing on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms – and a 
unilateral refusal to license claim – challenging a refusal to deal on 
reasonable terms – is a fine one. It is somewhat surprising that courts have 
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treated unilateral refusals to license differently, and somewhat more harshly, 
than they have treated essential facilities claims. 
Even so, antitrust decisions are skeptical of claims that involve unilateral 
refusals to deal. As we have seen,94 a party generally has the unilateral right 
to refuse to deal with whomever it chooses, for commercial reasons, for 
social or personal reasons, or for no reason at all.95 Only where a refusal to 
deal extends, preserves, creates, or threatens to create significant market 
power is it subject to scrutiny under Section 2 at all. And even there, a 
violation of Section 2 requires a court to find that the refusal to deal is itself 
‘anticompetitive conduct’ rather than a permissible exercise of corporate 
discretion. Courts have rarely done this, primarily in situations where the 
refusal cuts off a preexisting, profitable business relationship96 or where the 
refusal is conditional rather than unilateral.97 
Where the refusal to deal involves intellectual property rights, courts are 
even less willing to condemn it. As we have seen,98 the intellectual property 
rights necessarily embody the power to exclude others from the use of the 
right. For antitrust law to interfere with that right, there must be clear 
evidence that the exercise of the right facilitates monopolization that extends 
beyond the scope of the intellectual property right itself.99 Whether and how 
an antitrust plaintiff can make such a showing has been the subject of much 
recent controversy in the courts. Different circuits have taken three different 
approaches, which we detail in the sections below. 
1. Per se legality (Federal Circuit approach) 
The Federal Circuit dealt with the legality of unilateral refusals to license 
patent rights in two cases at the tail end of the Twentieth Century. The two 
decisions are somewhat at odds in their holdings. The first case is Intergraph 
v. Intel,100 discussed above for its holding regarding essential facilities.101 
Intergraph also alleged that Intel’s failure to continue to supply it with access 
to proprietary information, chips, and technical support constituted a refusal 
to deal that violated Section 2. The court seemed to take the approach 
discussed above for non-intellectual property cases. It began by observing 
that 
it is well established that in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly, the Sherman act does not restrict the long-recognized right of a trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own 
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.102 
The court acknowledged that refusals to deal ‘may raise antitrust concerns 
when the refusal is directed against competition and the purpose is to create, 
maintain, or enlarge a monopoly.’103 Nonetheless, it found no Section 2 
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violation based on Intel’s refusal to deal, both because it concluded that Intel 
and Intergraph did not compete at all, and because it saw the fact that 
Intergraph had sued Intel as a valid reason for Intel to cease giving Intergraph 
preferential treatment.104 
Only three months later, the Federal Circuit took a very different approach 
to unilateral refusals to license intellectual property in In re Independent 
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation.105 In that case, a group of 
independent service organizations (ISOs) that provided service for Xerox 
copiers sued Xerox for violating the antitrust laws because Xerox refused to 
sell parts to them or their customers. Xerox designed its policy so that it sold 
parts only to end-users that serviced the machines themselves, or to end-users 
who hired Xerox to perform service. The effect of the Xerox policy was to 
drive the ISOs out of the business of servicing Xerox copiers, and to reserve 
that business exclusively to Xerox.  
Xerox counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement, arguing that 
it had patents on a number of its parts and copyrights on its service drawings 
that the ISOs had infringed. Xerox also argued that it could not be held liable 
for violating the antitrust laws if all it did was unilaterally refuse to sell 
patented or copyrighted products to the ISOs, regardless of the purpose or 
effect of that refusal. 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Xerox. The court asserted that there was 
‘no reported case in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a 
unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent.’106 The court held that a 
patentee’s right to refuse to license its intellectual property right was limited 
only in certain circumstances: where the patent was obtained through fraud, 
where a lawsuit to enforce the patent was a sham, or where the patent holder 
uses his ‘statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in 
a market beyond the scope of the patent.’107  
In the case before it, the court held that Xerox had not sought to extend its 
patents beyond the scope of the statutory grant. It noted that patents 
themselves could cover more than one market, and it held without 
explanation that Xerox’s parts patents entitled it to control the market for 
service of Xerox copiers as well.108 And it refused to inquire into Xerox’s 
motivation for refusing to license its parts patents.109 Thus, the Federal 
Circuit created a per se rule of legality, in accord with earlier statements from 
both the Second and Sixth Circuits.110 
The Xerox court also considered Xerox’s refusal to license its copyrights. 
In doing so, it applied Tenth Circuit law. In the absence of any precedent 
from the Tenth Circuit, the court adopted the First Circuit’s approach in Data 
General, and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Image Technical.111 We 
discuss both approaches immediately below. 
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2. Rebuttable presumption (First Circuit approach) 
In Data General v. Grumman Systems Support,112 the First Circuit confronted 
an aftermarket exclusion claim similar in some respects to Xerox. In Data 
General, though, the ISOs were repairing computer hardware, and the ‘part’ 
they needed access to was Data General’s copyrighted diagnostic software. 
As in Xerox, Data General cut off access to the software in an effort to 
increase its own share of the service of its computers. When the ISOs 
obtained access to the software without permission, Data General sued for 
copyright infringement, and Grumman counterclaimed for violations of the 
antitrust laws. The district court rejected Grumman’s antitrust claims on 
summary judgment. 
The court engaged in what it described as ‘an exhaustive inquiry’ into the 
relationship between copyright and the antitrust laws.113 The court sought to 
read the two statutes in light of each other, rather than giving primacy to one 
over the other. In particular, it refused to adopt Data General’s proposed 
irrebuttable presumption that a unilateral refusal to license a copyright was 
legal. Instead, the court held that it must inquire into whether a refusal to 
license could support a claim for monopolization.114 Nonetheless, it created a 
presumption designed to take the copyrights into account: ‘[W]hile 
exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license 
a copyright, an author’s desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted 
work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm 
to consumers’.115 
Applying this presumption, the court held that summary judgment for Data 
General was appropriate. While there might be a genuine issue of fact as to 
harm to consumers, the court concluded, there was no evidence to rebut the 
presumption in this case. Data General’s old policy of permitting ISO 
competition had never led to a competitive market, so the withdrawal of its 
support couldn’t be proof of anticompetitive effect. The copyrights were 
valid, the copyrighted diagnostic software was innovative, and the court was 
unwilling to inquire into Data General’s motivation in enforcing the 
copyrights.116 
Thus, the First Circuit refused to apply a per se rule, settling instead for a 
strong presumption that even a monopolist acts lawfully by refusing to 
license its copyright. Xerox endorsed this rebuttable presumption in copyright 
(as opposed to patent) cases, saying it is ‘consistent with both the antitrust 
and the copyright laws’.117 
3. The role of intent (Ninth Circuit approach) 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a third approach in a case with facts strikingly 
similar to Xerox, and indeed one that arose in the same industry. Image 
Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak118 also involved an antitrust claim by 
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ISOs in the photocopier industry who had been cut off after years of 
coexistence, in this case by Kodak. Unlike Xerox, however, Kodak did not 
counterclaim for patent or copyright infringement. The case was litigated for 
almost ten years, including one trip to the US Supreme Court,119 before 
Kodak on remand asserted as a defense that some of its parts were covered by 
patents and its service software was covered by copyrights.  
The Ninth Circuit upheld a jury finding of antitrust liability.120 It found 
that Kodak had power in the market for service of Kodak copiers, and that 
Kodak had engaged in anticompetitive conduct by refusing to sell parts to 
ISOs, or to end users who dealt with ISOs. The court then proceeded to 
consider whether Kodak could offer a legitimate business justification for its 
conduct. The court recognized that while intellectual property owners are not 
immune from antitrust liability, ‘patent and copyright holders may refuse to 
sell or license protected work’121 and that no prior case imposed antitrust 
liability on the basis of a unilateral refusal to license.122 The court pointed 
out, however, that other sorts of conduct, such as concerted acts under 
Section 1 or extension of a patent beyond the lawful scope of its grant, could 
violate the antitrust laws.123 
With respect to unilateral refusals to license intellectual property, the 
Ninth Circuit endorsed the rebuttable presumption adopted in the Data 
General case.124 Nonetheless, the court refused to give Kodak the benefit of 
the presumption because it found the presumption had been rebutted.125 
Specifically, the court pointed to two pieces of evidence. The first was the 
fact that Kodak had thousands of parts, but that only 65 of those parts were 
patented. The second factor was one that the Data General court specifically 
rejected: the fact that Kodak’s intellectual property justifications were 
pretextual and adopted only long after the fact.126 The court defended the role 
of intent in the analysis, saying that ‘neither the aims of intellectual property 
law, or the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a 
pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.’127 
The court sought to cabin the likely effect of its holding. It noted that 
‘some weight [must] be given to the intellectual property rights of the 
monopolist’, and expressed ‘serious concern’ about the effect of claims like 
the one it permitted on the value of intellectual property rights.128 
Nonetheless, Image Technical adopts a modified form of the Data General 
presumption, both one that applies to patents as well as copyrights and one 
that allows evidence of the defendant’s intent in adopting its policy to 
overcome the presumption that a refusal to license is legitimate.  
4. Reconciling these approaches 
On their face, the opinions in Xerox, Data General and Image Technical 
present a rather stark conflict. Despite strikingly similar facts, the courts not 
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only reach different results but take fundamentally different approaches to 
reconciling antitrust and intellectual property law.129 In this section, we 
suggest some ways that these approaches might be reconciled. In the absence 
of such a reconciliation, however, the issue is ripe for review by the Supreme 
Court.130 
a. Distinguishing legitimate refusals to license from post hoc justifications. 
One way to reconcile the Image Technical, Xerox and Data General 
decisions may be to focus on the facts of each of the cases. While in one 
sense the three decisions involved very similar facts – indeed, Image 
Technical and Xerox arose in the same industry – the way in which the 
unilateral refusal issue came to the court was very different. In Xerox, the 
antitrust claim by the ISOs was met immediately by a counterclaim for patent 
and copyright infringement.131 By contrast, in Image Technical patents were 
not even an issue until many years into the litigation. Even then, Kodak never 
alleged infringement of its intellectual property rights, but merely asserted 
that the fact that it owned patents covering some of its parts immunized it 
from antitrust liability. 
This difference in facts offers the most plausible way to understand the 
Ninth Circuit’s much-criticized discussion of ‘intent’. As noted above, the 
Ninth Circuit did in fact adopt the Data General presumption that a refusal to 
license intellectual property rights was a legitimate business decision.132 It 
departed from the First Circuit approach only in permitting evidence of the 
antitrust defendant’s intent to rebut the presumption. A narrow reading of the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion – and indeed we think the reading the court most 
likely intended – would not open the door to evidence of intent to injure 
competition. Rather, it would merely permit the antitrust plaintiff to 
demonstrate that there was no legitimate refusal to license intellectual 
property rights at stake, and that the invocation of intellectual property rights 
was a ‘pretext’ – a post hoc justification for conduct that had nothing to do 
with intellectual property. Read in this light, Image Technical would not open 
the door to evidence of a defendant’s intent except in very specialized 
circumstances. While the evidentiary disputes engendered by Image 
Technical’s focus on statements of intent will likely be substantial, this 
reading helps to cabin them somewhat. 
We should note, however, that this understanding of Image Technical 
doesn’t necessarily justify the court’s result. At most, proof of such a pretext 
could strip Kodak of any special immunity its intellectual property rights 
might have conferred on it. But even owners of unpatented parts have a 
general right unilaterally to refuse to deal with particular customers.133 Thus, 
the court’s pretext finding merely permits it to reject one possible business 
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justification relating to intellectual property; it says nothing about how other, 
non-intellectual-property-related justifications might fare. 
It is also worth noting that none of the three cases were truly unilateral 
refusals to license in the pure sense. In each case, what was really at issue 
was a tying arrangement in which customers could get parts only if they also 
bought service. Because all of the cases were ultimately litigated on grounds 
of monopolization rather than tying,134 the courts approached them as 
unilateral refusals to license. But the rather unusual factual hybrid may 
account for differences in the cases. Xerox expressly recognized that tying 
arrangements involving patents could be illegal;135 it simply didn’t apply that 
rule to the conditional agreement at issue in the case before it. By contrast, 
while Image Technical did not apply the rules of tying, it was clearly 
concerned that Kodak was using its intellectual property rights as a cover for 
what was in effect a tying arrangement. It may be, therefore, that the courts 
simply focused on different aspects of the cases before them, and that were 
the Federal Circuit to consider a pure tie – or the Ninth Circuit to consider a 
pure refusal to license – they would reach results in accord with their sister 
circuits. 
b. Presumptions and risks of error. Even once these factual differences are 
taken into account, the three circuits take different approaches to the problem 
of unilateral refusals to license. While all three circuits are willing to presume 
that an intellectual property owner has the power to refuse to license or use its 
rights, only the Federal Circuit has made that presumption irrebuttable, and 
then only for patents.136 Both the First and Ninth Circuits are willing to 
permit some sorts of evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. They 
disagree, however, about what kinds of evidence are acceptable. 
This disagreement over the right presumption is fundamentally about the 
costs of various sorts of error. An irrebuttable presumption of legality, like 
per se rules of illegality, establishes relatively clear rules for behavior. It may 
be applied to reach problematic results in some cases, however. By contrast, 
rebuttable presumptions offer somewhat less predictability, but permit courts 
to delve into the factual context of the cases before them in order to 
determine competitive effect. In deciding which rule is appropriate, therefore, 
courts must consider three factors: the risk of erroneously condemning 
procompetitive conduct, the risk of erroneously permitting anticompetitive 
conduct, and the administrative and uncertainty costs associated with a more 
flexible standard.137 
An irrebuttable presumption may be appropriate given these factors, but 
only within narrow confines. Where the core right of exclusion is at stake, 
prohibiting enforcement of an intellectual property right will likely impose 
significant uncertainty costs on all intellectual property owners. Further, 
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while there may be anticompetitive effects from a unilateral refusal to license 
a valid intellectual property right, those effects are a natural consequence of 
the intellectual property laws themselves, not the defendant’s conduct. By 
contrast, where the refusal to license is not truly unilateral, where it is 
conditioned in an effort to expand the scope of the intellectual property right, 
or where it covers rights not granted by the intellectual property laws, the 
irrebuttable presumption should not apply. Indeed, it is not clear that any 
presumption of legality is appropriate in these sorts of cases.  
Thus, while we agree in principle with the legal rule established in Xerox, 
we believe it will be applicable only in a very narrow set of cases. Indeed, as 
noted above, it is not clear that Xerox itself was truly a case involving an 
unconditioned, unilateral refusal to license. In the sections that follow, we 
discuss some issues relating to the proper scope of any such presumption.138 
E. Duty to Continue Dealing 
Courts are sometimes willing to impose antitrust duties on monopolists to 
continue existing relationships in circumstances in which they would not be 
required to enter into new relationships. A notable example is Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.139 In that case, Highlands and Ski Co. 
operated competing ski mountains in Aspen, Colorado. There are four 
mountains in Aspen; while they were originally individually owned, at the 
time of litigation Ski Co. had purchased three of the four. The four mountains 
had a long-standing joint lift ticket arrangement, under which a skier could 
buy one multi-day ticket good for any mountain. When Ski Co. terminated 
the arrangement, Highlands sued, arguing that Ski Co. was trying to drive it 
out of business. The jury found that Ski Co. had acted anticompetitively by 
ending the arrangement, and that the effect was to enable it to monopolize the 
market. The Supreme Court affirmed. It refused to decide whether the joint 
lift ticket was an essential facility, instead concluding that Ski Co.’s failure to 
continue a profitable existing business relationship without a legitimate 
justification itself violated Section 2.140 The Court did not hold that a 
monopolist had a duty to deal with its rivals, though it noted that a refusal to 
deal ‘may have evidentiary significance’.141 The Court focused significant 
attention, though, on Ski Co.’s refusal to continue a profitable existing 
business relationship with Highlands. It noted that the joint lift ticket 
provided benefits to both sides, and that there were no plausible changes in 
factual circumstances to render the joint lift ticket unprofitable to Ski Co. It 
found sufficient evidence ‘that Ski Company was not motivated by efficiency 
concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer 
goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival’.142 
This in turn was sufficient to violate Section 2. 
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Aspen may well be sui generis.143 Indeed, the Supreme Court has described 
it as existing ‘at or near the outer boundary of §2 liability.’144 But to the 
extent it establishes a general principle of law, that principle seems to be that 
terminating an existing business relationship without a legitimate efficiency-
related reason may violate the antitrust laws even where a monopolist would 
be under no obligation to enter into a new relationship along the same 
lines.145 The Supreme Court’s decision in Kodak v. Image Technical 
Services146 seemed to give further support to the idea that terminating existing 
relationships can be problematic.  
Neither case involved intellectual property, at least as presented to the 
Supreme Court.147 The question for our purposes is whether Aspen and Kodak 
might be read to compel an intellectual property owner to continue an 
existing license arrangement, even though the same owner would not be 
obligated to enter into a new license arrangement. Notwithstanding Aspen, we 
think the answer must be no. 
In the first place, Xerox, Data General, and Image Technical all involved 
refusals to continue an existing business relationship. Despite this fact, the 
courts in Xerox and Data General found no antitrust violation. While the 
court did find a violation in Image Technical, it did not focus on the 
continuing nature of the relationship, but rather on the fact that intellectual 
property rights were raised only as a pretext. Xerox did not consider the 
continuing nature of the relationship relevant at all. Only Data General 
suggested it might be relevant in the intellectual property context. The court 
there refused to apply Aspen only ‘because we are unable to view DG’s 
market practices in both competitive and noncompetitive condition’, and so 
unable to infer that Data General’s change of heart occurred because it was 
now a monopolist.148 The courts to consider the issue have not generally 
treated the existence of a prior relationship as particularly important. 
We think that there are reasons to be particularly wary of reading Aspen to 
compel continued dealing in the intellectual property context. Intellectual 
property licenses are generally quite complex, and they often involve 
technologies and markets that change rapidly. Locking companies into 
existing business relationships seems particularly inappropriate in fast-
changing markets. Intellectual property licenses are often exclusive, in whole 
or in part; locking in relationships in such a context may prevent competition 
by other potential licensees down the road. Further, as a general matter 
antitrust law wants to encourage the licensing of intellectual property, since 
the alternative may be monopoly or at least more centralized control over 
production.149 Forcing companies to continue an existing license relationship 
may have the perverse effect of discouraging them from licensing their 
intellectual property rights in the first place. In short, we think it would be a 
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mistake to depart from the presumptions that protect unilateral refusals to 
license merely because the parties had had a relationship in the past. 
F. Determining the Scope of Intellectual Property Rights150 
It should be clear that any presumption of legality based on a unilateral 
refusal to license intellectual property rights extends only so far as those 
rights themselves do. As an initial matter, therefore, efforts to enforce or 
refusals to license clearly invalid intellectual property rights, or efforts to 
enforce valid intellectual property rights against conduct that clearly does not 
infringe, must be outside the protection of the presumption.151 Xerox and 
Data General both explicitly acknowledge that antitrust claims can be based 
on sham litigation or Walker Process allegations without interfering with the 
proper scope of the intellectual property laws. 
The point is more general, however. The protection of the intellectual 
property laws should extend only as far as those laws themselves extend. A 
refusal to license will be presumed legitimate if the conduct for which a 
license is withheld is in fact within the scope of an intellectual property right. 
But the presumption should not extend to protect refusals to license that go 
beyond the scope of the intellectual property rights themselves.152 That 
doesn’t mean that the refusal to provide, say, uncopyrighted information is 
illegal, of course. As with any other unilateral refusal to deal outside the 
intellectual property context, it will normally be legal. Rather, the point is 
merely that the Xerox-Data General presumption cannot protect conduct that 
is itself outside the scope of an intellectual property right. 
United States v. Microsoft is an example.153 Among the government’s 
allegations of anticompetitive conduct in that case were challenges to 
Microsoft’s refusal to permit computer hardware manufacturers to introduce 
their own boot-up screen or to modify the appearance of the Windows 
desktop in any way, notably by removing the Internet explorer icon. In the 
pretrial proceedings,154 Microsoft moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
because Windows was copyrighted, it could not violate the antitrust laws by 
refusing to let people alter the program. Microsoft claimed that its license 
restrictions on hardware manufacturers ‘merely highlight and expressly state 
the rights that Microsoft already enjoys under federal copyright law’. The 
district court rejected this argument on summary judgment. It held: 
Microsoft argues that it ‘may refrain from vending or licensing and content [itself] 
with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using [its intellectual] 
property.’ See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, 52 S.Ct. 546, 76 L.Ed. 
1010 (1932). But whatever copyright protection Microsoft enjoys in its software is 
not unlimited. For example, copyright in a computer program does not extend to its 
functional aspects. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 
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(1st Cir.1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233, 116 S.Ct. 804, 133 
L.Ed.2d 610 (1996). It does not preclude design choices dictated by necessity, cost, 
convenience or consumer demand. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir.1994) (user interface of computer program 
entitled to only limited protection against ‘virtually identical’ copying, because of 
license and because of limited number of different ways the underlying idea can be 
expressed); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir.1992) 
(significant portions of structure, sequence, and organization of program may be 
copied in order to write similar program to run on different platform). And it does 
not render inviolate portions of the program that are not original to its creator. 
Furthermore, copyright law does not give Microsoft blanket authority to license 
(or refuse to license) its intellectual property as it sees fit. A copyright does not 
give its holder immunity from laws of general applicability, including the antitrust 
laws. Copyright holders are restricted in their ability to extend their control to other 
markets. They may not prevent the development and use of interoperable programs 
by competitors. Antitrust liability may also attach to other anticompetitive 
licensing restrictions involving copyrighted works.155 
The court didn’t deny that Microsoft owned a valid copyright in its Windows 
operating system. But it noted that ownership of an intellectual property right 
does not give the owner carte blanche over all uses of the intellectual 
property. In particular, the court found that Microsoft failed to demonstrate 
that the hardware manufacturers would be violating its copyrights if they 
made the prohibited alterations to the start-up and home screens. The court 
rejected Microsoft’s argument that it had a moral right of integrity in its 
software, and held that ‘the extent of copyright protection in the specific 
portions of the software plaintiffs seek to modify’ presented a disputed issue 
of fact. 
After trial, the court found that ‘Microsoft has presented no evidence that 
the contractual (or the technological) restrictions it placed on OEMs’ ability 
to alter Windows derive from any of the enumerated rights explicitly granted 
to a copyright holder under the Copyright Act’.156 As a result, it could not 
benefit from the presumption of legitimacy, however articulated, that attends 
refusals to license intellectual property rights. Microsoft hadn’t simply 
exercised its copyright rights; it had sought to impose on hardware 
manufacturers a restriction that copyright law did not support.157  
Assuming the court was right as a matter of copyright law to conclude that 
the minor modifications in question didn’t constitute derivative works, its 
antitrust conclusion seems correct as well. A presumption of legitimacy in 
refusing to license an intellectual property right – and certainly an irrebuttable 
presumption of the sort Xerox adopts for patents cases – is appropriate only 
where there is in fact a refusal to license an intellectual property right. Where 
the intellectual property owner seeks to expand by contract the scope of rights 
allocated to it, a very different issue is presented.158 Whether or not patent 
and copyright law permit such contractual expansions, the contracts are 
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surely not immune from antitrust liability. Indeed, such licensing restrictions 
are the primary source of antitrust violations involving intellectual property. 
A prerequisite to applying the Xerox or Data General presumption, 
therefore, is proof not only that the defendant owns a valid intellectual 
property right, but that the use the plaintiff proposes would in fact infringe 
that right. This is more likely to be an issue in copyright than patent law, 
because copyright contains many more restrictions on the scope of the right. 
Copyright protection doesn’t extend to ideas, facts, functional elements, 
scenes a faire, or unoriginal portions of a work.159 It covers only duplication, 
adaptation, distribution, and public performance and display, not all uses that 
might be made of a work.160 And it is subject to numerous exceptions and 
defenses, including not only the fair use doctrine161 but also a complex series 
of compulsory licensing schemes.162 The latter are particularly important; it 
would obviously be anomalous to conclude that copyright law protected a 
refusal to license in circumstances in which copyright law itself required 
licensing on defined terms. 
While the rights granted a patentee are much stronger – including the right 
to control any making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing of the 
patented invention163 – they too are not unlimited. Patent law restricts a 
patentee’s control through the exhaustion doctrine,164 through the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents,165 and most importantly through limitations tied to 
the scope of the patent claims. It is not enough to assert ownership of a patent 
right that covers a product in a general sense; for a refusal to license to be 
protected by the Xerox presumption, the patent must be infringed by the 
proposed use.166 
G. Distinguishing Antitrust Violations from the Scope of Antitrust 
Remedies 
A second limitation on the scope of the Xerox and Data General 
presumptions concerns the distinction between antitrust violations and 
antitrust remedies. In this chapter we have discussed whether a unilateral 
refusal to license an intellectual property right can violate the antitrust laws, 
either on its own (under some sort of essential facilities doctrine) or as 
anticompetitive conduct sufficient to support a Section 2 claim when coupled 
with proof of monopoly power and causation. Except in the most unusual 
circumstances, a pure unilateral refusal to license cannot support such a 
claim. 
A different set of issues is presented by judicial efforts to compel licensing 
of an intellectual property right as a remedy for other sorts of antitrust 
violations. Compulsory licensing has a long history as an antitrust remedy,167 
and may be quite appropriate depending on the nature of the antitrust 
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violation itself. So long as the refusal to license is not a part of the finding of 
violation, compelled licensing as an antitrust remedy doesn’t run afoul of the 
presumption we have discussed in this section.168 Compelling licensing of 
intellectual property rights as an antitrust remedy does present a variety of 
other issues, of course, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.169 
IV. DISTINGUISHING UNILATERAL FROM 
CONDITIONAL OR CONCERTED REFUSALS 
This chapter treats unilateral refusals to license intellectual property rights, 
not concerted and conditional refusals to deal. Nonetheless, because of the 
very different rules applied to unilateral refusals to license, defining what is –
 and what isn’t – a ‘unilateral’ refusal becomes quite important. In this 
section we distinguish true unilateral refusals to license both from concerted 
action and from ‘conditional’ refusals. 
A. Concerted Refusals to Deal  
Antitrust law draws a fundamental distinction between unilateral and 
concerted action. Unilateral conduct is generally dealt with under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. By contrast, Section 1 of the Sherman Act separately 
prohibits unreasonable agreements in restraint of trade. The Section 1 
prohibitions on conduct are, generally speaking, stricter than the Section 2 
rules. The law will condemn certain combinations among competitors per se, 
and even where the per se rule does not apply Section 1 does not always 
require a showing of market power for illegality.170  
This fundamental distinction plays an historic role in intellectual property 
cases as well. Courts have distinguished between an intellectual property 
owner’s exercise of its lawfully granted right and that same owner’s 
agreement with others to constrain their pricing or output decisions. 
Agreements concerning the disposition of intellectual property rights can be 
illegal even when unilateral action is not.171 There are myriad examples; 
among the most common types of concerted conduct relating to intellectual 
property are tying arrangements, patent pools and cross-licenses, grantback 
clauses and field of use restrictions.172  
Because of this fundamental distinction, it should be clear that the cases 
we have discussed apply only to unilateral and not concerted action by 
intellectual property owners. In Xerox, for example, the court expressly 
discussed the requirements for monopolization under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.173 The Xerox court considered only allegations that a patentee’s 
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unilateral efforts to ‘enforce the statutory right to exclude others’ violated the 
antitrust laws.174 There is nothing in the opinion (or in Data General or 
Image Technical)175 to suggest that the court meant its ruling to extend to 
situations in which the patentee agreed with another to restrict competition. 
The body of law on unilateral refusals to license cannot displace the 
voluminous precedent concerning either horizontal or vertical agreements. 
B. Conditional Refusals to Deal  
Determining that Xerox and related cases do not apply to concerted action 
doesn’t resolve the issue of their scope, however. The line between individual 
and concerted acts in antitrust law has historically proven quite malleable. 
We must therefore inquire whether the line of cases dealing with ‘unilateral’ 
refusals to license covers only ‘pure’ unilateral refusals, or whether it ought 
to be extended to circumstances in which an intellectual property owner 
effectively enters into an agreement imposing conditions on a licensee, but 
structures the transaction in such a way that the conditions are unilaterally 
announced rather than being part of an express agreement.  
1. Relevance of Xerox 
Xerox did not hold that unilateral conduct by an intellectual property owner 
enforcing a patent right can never be illegal under Section 2. Rather, it 
identified three circumstances in which a patent owner could violate 
Section 2, and discussed each in some detail. First, a patentee could enforce a 
patent obtained by fraud – a so-called Walker Process violation. Second, a 
patentee could engage in sham litigation. Both of these exceptions are well-
recognized, and involve a patentee asserting in court a right it does not 
legitimately own.176 Finally, the court noted the ‘undisputed premise that the 
patent holder cannot use his statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to 
gain a monopoly in a market beyond the scope of the patent.’177 This suggests 
that even unilateral conduct may be illegal under Xerox if the effect of that 
conduct is to extend the power of an intellectual property right beyond its 
lawful scope. 
In the course of summarizing the rule it was adopting, however, the Xerox 
court chose language much more limiting than in its detailed discussion: 
In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark 
Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to 
exclude others from making, using or selling the claimed invention free from 
liability under the antitrust laws.178 
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It is possible to read this language as foreclosing any antitrust claim not based 
on tying, Walker Process fraud, or sham litigation, and indeed one court has 
done so. In Townshend v. Rockwell Int’l, the court reasoned that since ‘a 
patent owner has the legal right to refuse to license his or her patent on any 
terms, the existence of a predicate condition to a license agreement cannot 
state an antitrust violation’.179 We do not think the court intended such a 
sweeping holding, however.180 In the first place, as noted above, the court’s 
more detailed discussion included anticompetitive extension of a patent right, 
not just tying, within its ambit. It is likely, therefore, that the court’s later 
mention of such cases as ‘tying’ claims was intended to restate rather than to 
undo its prior discussion. Second, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
‘power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent [or] 
copyright, . . . can give rise to liability if “a seller exploits his dominant 
position in one market to expand his empire into the next”.’181 For the Federal 
Circuit, to restrict antitrust claims involving valid patents to tying cases 
would appear to conflict with the Supreme Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on the issue.182 An alternative reading of Xerox would require 
the courts to jettison a century of jurisprudence involving the legality of 
conditions imposed by intellectual property owners on licensees. Even if a 
Federal Circuit panel had the power to make such a sweeping change in the 
law, we should not lightly impute to the court a desire to do so. Finally, at 
least for exclusive dealing cases, Section 3 of the Clayton Act forecloses such 
a reading, since it clearly applies to unilateral conduct involving goods 
‘whether patented or unpatented’.183 Exclusive dealing, at least, must 
therefore fall outside the Xerox rule. 
A more plausible reading of Xerox is that the court intended to encompass 
within its new rule of per se legality only conduct within the legitimate scope 
of the intellectual property right. Conduct that seeks to expand the scope of 
an intellectual property right will not be protected from antitrust liability. 
What conduct that includes remains to be fully determined, however. We 
consider this issue in the following section. 
2. Distinguishing Section 1 and Section 2 cases 
In light of the preferential treatment of unilateral refusals to license, 
intellectual property owners may be expected to attempt to characterize their 
conduct as a unilateral refusal to license. For example, suppose that a patent 
owner wishes to tie a license to its patent to the purchase of a staple article of 
commerce – say, salt. If the patent owner enters into contracts with licensees 
requiring them to buy salt from it, the contract is unquestionably a tying 
arrangement, and under traditional antitrust law may well be illegal.184 
Suppose instead that the patentee were merely to announce to the world that it 
was free to deal with whomever it chose, and that henceforth it would only 
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grant licenses to those who ‘voluntarily’ chose to buy salt from the patentee. 
Does the change in the form of the restriction – from a contract to a unilateral 
announcement – change the legal result?185 
Antitrust law has faced a similar characterization problem in trying to 
distinguish vertical agreements treated under Section 1 from permissible 
unilateral conduct.186 The maker of a product is generally free to decide to 
whom it will sell, and to terminate its buyers at will.187 But this right does not 
include the right to impose certain types of conditions on those buyers – 
notably but not exclusively tying arrangements and resale price restrictions. 
The result has been a rather complex line-drawing process, in which courts 
permit termination of buyers who don’t adhere to certain conditions but 
forbid any sort of negotiation or other effort to convince buyers to comply 
with the conditions.188 This body of law can justifiably be criticized as 
extremely formalist. 
This set of rules has been expressly applied to intellectual property 
licenses by the Fourth Circuit in Service & Training Inc. v. Data General.189 
That case, like the First Circuit’s decision in Data General, involved Data 
General’s decision to stop supplying diagnostic software to independent 
service organizations repairing Data General computers for customers. The 
plaintiff there alleged that Data General’s refusal to sell them copies of the 
diagnostic software, while making the software available to its ultimate 
customers who wished to self-service, constituted a de facto tying 
arrangement. The court rejected this theory because it found only a unilateral 
decision by Data General as to who it wished to do business with: 
Appellants’ evidence at bottom shows nothing more than a unilateral decision by 
Data General to license MV/ADEX to [end-users] but not to others. The fact that 
Data General has selectively licensed MV/ADEX is not evidence of an illegal tying 
agreement. Data General may lawfully license MV/ADEX to whomever it 
chooses.190 
The court made it clear, however, that the plaintiff’s tying theory could have 
proceeded had they demonstrated an agreement of some sort between Data 
General and its customers. Data General avoided the reach of tying law 
because its decision was unilateral – it simply chose to sell its software to 
customers but not to competitors.  
In applying these rules to intellectual property cases, it is important to keep 
in mind several limits on the ability of intellectual property owners to stretch 
the Xerox rule to cover conditional conduct. First, notwithstanding the 
antitrust advantages of unilateral action, there are a number of powerful 
incentives for intellectual property owners to enter into express licensing 
agreements. Many intellectual property licenses involve a continuing 
relationship between the parties in which not only patent rights but also trade 
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secrets and other forms of know-how are exchanged. In such a circumstance, 
it is in the interest of both parties to clearly set out the rights and obligations 
of each. While it is perhaps possible to imagine writing a ‘unilateral action 
policy’ that takes these complexities into account – in which an intellectual 
property owner ‘announces’ that they will license only to parties that agree to 
a list of conditions – that is surely not the sort of unilateral conduct the Xerox 
court had in mind. Where an intellectual property owner seeks to compel 
certain types of conduct or obligations from its licensees rather than merely to 
distinguish between groups of buyers, the resulting relationship is an 
agreement on conditions, not a pure unilateral refusal to license.  
Second, many of the conditions intellectual property owners might wish to 
impose involve promises by licensees to act or refrain from acting in certain 
ways in the future. Grantback clauses, some sorts of ties and reciprocal deals, 
confidentiality and noncompetition obligations cannot be monitored ex ante. 
In each case, the intellectual property owner is granting a right today in return 
for a promise that the licensee will act in a certain way tomorrow. What such 
an owner needs is an enforceable right to compel a licensee to act as 
promised in the future. That in turn requires an enforceable agreement setting 
out the condition, not just the power to decide unilaterally whom to license 
today. This is particularly true with respect to certain types of intellectual 
property transactions – trade secrets, know-how, access to unprotectable facts 
– in which the disclosure of the know-how is irreversible.  
Third, the Sherman Act is not the only antitrust statute that might come 
into play where a license is conditioned. In particular, Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act prohibits the imposition of certain types of conditions – notably 
ties and exclusive deals – in transactions in commodities.191 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that even under Xerox an intellectual 
property owner’s right to unilaterally refuse to license is not absolute. Xerox 
followed Data General in applying only a rebuttable presumption of 
legitimacy in copyright as opposed to patent cases. Microsoft is to the same 
effect.192 One court has held that Xerox’s irrebuttable presumption does not 
apply to trade secrets.193 Further, as noted above, even unilateral refusals to 
license patents will not be immune from Section 2 scrutiny if they operate to 
expand a patent beyond its lawful scope. Thus, even if a patentee succeeds in 
characterizing a conditional refusal to deal (such as a tie) as ‘unilateral’ 
conduct, the patentee will still face potential liability under the Supreme 
Court decision in Eastman Kodak for using the condition to expand the 
effective scope of the right. 
This is, we think, as it should be. The preferential rules governing 
unilateral conduct are designed to protect an intellectual property owner in 
the lawful exercise of the rights the law has given it. If the intellectual 
property owner seeks more than the intellectual property laws expressly 
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permit, it must contend with the limits that antitrust law places on conditional 
and concerted conduct.194  
C. Acquisitions of Intellectual Property 
The pure case of a unilateral refusal to license must also be distinguished 
from cases in which the antitrust claim is based on the acquisition of 
intellectual property rights through merger or purchase. Such acquisitions are 
treated under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,195 
the court distinguished between Xerox’s refusal to license its patents, which it 
found to be permissible, and Xerox’s original acquisition of those patents, 
which presented a Section 7 issue. A company could violate Section 7 by 
accumulating too strong a patent portfolio through acquisition,196 but if the 
acquisition of the patents didn’t violate the antitrust laws, the company was 
free to enforce those patents just as if it had developed them internally.197 
D. Intel Decisions and Cross-Licensing 
Adverse effects on competition are not limited to higher prices and reduced 
output. They can also include adverse effects on innovation incentives. In 
both government and private suits against Intel in the late 1990s, the plaintiffs 
charged that Intel had reduced competitors’ incentives to innovate by 
demanding a royalty-free license to the patents of any company it did 
business with. In particular, the FTC charged that Intel had cut off business 
dealings with Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital Equipment Corporation, in 
each case after the company sued or threatened to sue it for patent 
infringement.198 The government alleged that the effect of Intel’s blanket 
policy of demanding royalty-free licenses and refusing to deal with those who 
sued it for patent infringement was to reduce others’ incentives to innovate in 
the market Intel dominated, since they could not obtain revenue from 
licensing patents to the most likely licensee.199 Similarly, Intergraph brought 
a wide-ranging antitrust suit against Intel based on the same conduct. Both of 
these claims were filed under Section 2, and both challenge Intel’s refusal to 
continue dealing with Intergraph. However, they do not seem appropriately 
within the scope of the Xerox rule, because the refusal to license is not 
absolute. Rather, the license is conditioned on the licensee’s willingness to 
grant a royalty-free license to its intellectual property to Intel.200 
The resolution of these two cases differed. In the private action, the 
Federal Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction against Intel.201 The court 
rejected a wide variety of antitrust theories proffered by the plaintiffs, 
including tying202 and the essential facilities doctrine.203 In rejecting 
Intergraph’s monopolization claim, the court emphasized that Intergraph was 
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an Intel customer, and sold products in a different, downstream market. Since 
the companies were not direct competitors in product sales, the court 
reasoned, Intel could not be held liable for monopolizing Intergraph’s 
market.204 By contrast, the FTC suit ended with a consent decree in which 
Intel agreed not to stop dealing with companies merely because they sued it 
to enforce intellectual property rights. Intel reserved the right to end 
relationships with companies for a variety of legitimate business reasons, 
however.205 
The strength of the economic theory behind these cases is uncertain. As an 
initial matter, the Federal Circuit was almost certainly too facile in its 
rejection of Intergraph’s claim. It is true that Intel and Intergraph are in a 
vertical relationship in the products market, and that Intel has not made a 
serious effort to integrate downstream into Intergraph’s market. As a result, 
Intel cannot possibly be held liable for monopolizing the graphics 
workstation market, where Intergraph competes. But that does not dispose of 
the case. Intergraph owned patents that conferred rights in Intel’s core market 
for microprocessors. Intel’s actions were designed to obtain a royalty free 
license to those patents and therefore arguably to protect its dominance in the 
microprocessor market. The Federal Circuit did not focus on Intergraph’s 
ownership of intellectual property assets that competed directly with Intel. 
But that fact seems critical to the case, as the FTC properly recognized. 
Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that Intel has done anything 
wrong. As we have seen, companies have a strong right to refuse to deal with 
individual firms for any legitimate business reason or even for no reason at 
all.206 And as the Federal Circuit observed, the fact that a company is suing 
you would seem to be a legitimate reason to stop doing business with them.207 
It would seem anomalous to insulate a company from termination by virtue of 
the fact that it had sued its supplier, when companies with less adversarial 
business relationships are not so protected. To the extent that Intergraph 
complained merely of being terminated by Intel because it sued them, 
therefore, we believe the Federal Circuit was right to reject the complaint. 
The FTC alleged something more, however: a pattern of refusing to deal 
with multiple buyers unless they grant Intel blanket access to their intellectual 
property rights. The FTC’s Section 2 case further depended critically on the 
facts that Intel had monopoly power in the microprocessor market, and that 
the effect of its policy was to discourage innovation by actual or potential 
competitors in that market208 by reducing or eliminating the value of their 
intellectual property related to microprocessors. As a result, the FTC argued, 
Intel helped maintain its monopoly in the microprocessor market by 
discouraging leapfrogging innovations.209 We think the FTC’s claim is 
critically dependent on proof of these facts. In particular, it is important to 
distinguish the FTC’s allegations of an industry-wide pattern of conduct 
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directed at discouraging innovation from the complaints of a single 
terminated buyer. 
Even with these limitations, the FTC’s theory is somewhat troubling. 
Companies in many industries, including semiconductors, regularly enter into 
royalty-free cross-licensing agreements. The law normally treats these 
agreements as procompetitive because they free both parties to compete on 
the merits without being restricted by overlapping or blocking patent 
rights.210 To the extent Intel is attempting to avoid being ‘held up’ by 
patentees making unreasonable claims, its demand for a license seems not 
only legitimate but procompetitive.211 At a minimum, these possible 
procompetitive effects must be taken into account before concluding that any 
such licensing policy violates Section 2. Claims based on unilateral refusals 
to license an intellectual property right are rarely successful in the US. Where 
they are successful, it is normally because the refusal is not truly unilateral, 
but represents an effort to condition a license on some anticompetitive end. 
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a product that costs $500. Over the next several years, the price of the product drops to 
$25. The royalty now seems exorbitant, and licensees will doubtless want relief from the 
original royalty. 
34  We discuss concerted conduct and conditional licenses in detail in IP and Antitrust (supra 
Note 1). See generally Chapters 20–36 in that treatise.  
35  See e.g. Corsearch v. Thomson & Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305 (SDNY 1992) (questioning 
whether terminating a license of a copyrighted database to a competitor could be 
anticompetitive, but not addressing the issue because it found no monopoly power). 
36  Commentators have argued, for instance, that price discrimination has such procompetitive 
justifications, and indeed that it may not be evidence of the existence of market power at 
all. See Klein, Benjamin and John Shepard Wiley Jr. (2003), ‘Competitive Price 
Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal’, 
Antitrust L.J., 70 (3), 599 (arguing that price discrimination is procompetitive and does not 
tend to show market power); Baker, Jonathan B. (2003), ‘Competitive Price 
Discrimination: The Exercise of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects’, Antitrust 
L.J., 70 (3), 643 (arguing that price discrimination does show market power, but not 
necessarily anticompetitive effect). To the extent that these arguments are correct, a desire 
by an intellectual property owner to price discriminate may serve to justify a unilateral but 
conditional refusal to deal. 
37  We deal with such claims in detail in IP and Antitrust (supra Note 1), Chapter 11. 
38  For good discussions of essential facilities in the intellectual property context, see 
Donahey, Teague I. (1997), ‘Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine to Ensure Accessibility to Internet Software Standards’, AIPLA Q.J., 25, 277; 
Lipsky, Abbott B. Hr. and J. Gregory Sidak (1999), ‘Essential Facilities’, Stan. L. Rev., 51, 
1187, at pp. 1218–20 (1999); McGowan, David (1996), ‘Regulating Competition in the 
Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act’, 
Hastings Comm/Ent. L.J., 18, 771. 
39  The monopolist in an essential facilities case may be thought to have ‘acted’ in some 
sense, by refusing to deal or to continue dealing with a competitor. But generally speaking 
a unilateral refusal to deal is not the sort of affirmative anticompetitive conduct that the 
antitrust law is concerned with. 
40  United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 224 US 383 (1912). 
41  Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 US 366 (1973). 
42  MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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43  A very different sort of essential-facility-type claim is envisioned by those few cases that 
impose a duty to continue dealing. For example, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 US 585 (1985), the Court held that a ski company that owned 3 of the 4 
mountains in a local area was obligated to continue offering a multi-area skiing pass with 
its sole competitor in that local area. While the Court did not discuss the case in essential 
facilities terms, there is no other antitrust concept that readily fits these circumstances. By 
avoiding the use of essential facilities language, however, the Court short-circuited inquiry 
into how important the multi-area pass actually was to competition. 
44  MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132–33. 
45  See Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 544–46 (9th Cir. 1991) (airline 
computer reservation system was not an essential facility because airlines could compete 
without it, albeit at higher cost). 
46  Whether this defense would extend to other sorts of business justifications for refusing to 
deal is not clear. 
47  It is not clear that Terminal Railroad fits easily in this framework, but that case may be 
complicated by its reliance on a conspiracy between different railroads in violation of 
Section 1. 
48 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004). 
49  See e.g. Areeda, Philip (1989), ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting 
Principles’, Antitrust L.J., 58, 841; Hovenkamp, Herbert, Federal Antitrust Policy, §7.7 
(‘The so-called essential facility doctrine is one of the most troublesome, incoherent and 
unmanageable of bases for Sherman § 2 liability. The antitrust world would almost 
certainly be a better place if it were jettisoned . . . ’); McGowan, David (1996), ‘Regulating 
Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the 
Sherman Act’, Hastings Comm/Ent. L.J., 18, 771. 
50  See Lemley, Mark A. (1996), ‘Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem’, Conn. 
L. Rev., 28, 1041, at pp. 1085–86. 
51  The European Court of Justice did find a copyrighted television guide to be an essential 
facility in the Magill case, C-241/91 P (E.C.J. 1995). That decision is discussed in this 
book in Chapter 3 (see also Chapters 5, 8, 9). 
52  195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
53  Id. at 1350. Most of those antitrust claims are based on Intel’s efforts to link the two sets of 
intellectual property rights together. As such, they involve conditional rather than pure 
unilateral refusals to deal. 
54  Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998). 
55  195 F.3d at 1356–1359. 
56  Id. at 1357 (‘the essential facility theory is not an invitation to demand access to the 
property or privileges of another, on pain of antitrust penalties and compulsion; thus the 
courts have required anticompetitive action by a monopolist that is intended to “eliminate 
competition in the downstream market”.’). 
57  Id. (‘A non-competitor’s asserted need for a manufacturer’s business information does not 
convert the withholding of that information into an antitrust violation’.). Cf. Multivideo 
Labs v. Intel Corp., 2000 WL 502866 (SDNY 27 April 2000) (monopoly leveraging claim 
fails where the parties are not competitors).  
 The court was arguably incorrect to conclude that the parties were not in the same market. 
While Intergraph sold its products in a market downstream from Intel’s, Intergraph’s 
intellectual property rights, the assertion of which triggered the dispute, were in the same 
technology market as Intel’s primary line of business (microprocessors). The court’s 
failure to recognize this doesn’t affect the essential facilities analysis, however, because 
any such competition would exist in the market for the essential facility itself, not the 
downstream market Intel was allegedly trying to control. 
58  995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
59  Id. at 751. 
60  Id. at 752. 
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61  Id. at 754. 
62  The court did not discuss the possibility that network effects could have economic 
consequences for the market similar to those of natural monopolies. 
63  Id. at 753. 
64  Id. at 755.  
65  Id. at 753. 
66  Id. at 755–56. 
67  719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988); rev’d on other grounds 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 
1993). 
68  Id. at 1563. This conclusion was reversed on appeal. 
69  Id. at 1566. 
70  Aldridge, 995 F. Supp. at 755 n.146. 
71  We detail these unusual circumstances in Section III.C.3, infra. 
72  For more detail, see Areeva and Hovenkamp (supra Note 31), 3A Antitrust Law ¶¶ 771–
74, 787 (arguing that the essential facilities doctrine is generally unwarranted, but that an 
exception may reasonably be made for public utilities). 
73 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004). 
74  See also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(government challenged a refusal to deal on the ground that Mitsubishi had ‘become so 
wedded to Westinghouse technology, because of the Agreements, as to be unable to 
compete in the United States market.’). 
75  See Section II. 
76  See Section II.D. 
77  Whether or not our per se rule is adopted, it should be clear that courts regularly reject 
such claims. In addition to the cases discussed above, see Service & Training, Inc. v. Data 
General Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992) (‘a better mouse trap is not necessarily an 
essential facility’.); Sun Dun, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381, 394 (D. Md. 1990) 
(trademark is not an essential facility); Hudson’s Bay Co. v. American Legend Co-Op, 651 
F. Supp. 819, 843 n.14 (DNJ 1986) (same). 
78 274 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745 (D. Md. 2003). 
79  No. C-3626 (FTC Nov. 14, 1995). 
80  Id. 
81  The Tunney Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), codified as amended at 15 
USC § 16(b)–(h) (1994), requires that courts approve such settlements as being in the 
public interest. But the standard applied is quite lax. See United States v. Microsoft, 56 
F.3d 1448 (DC Cir. 1995). 
82  Indeed, this is plausibly what was at stake in BellSouth. While the district court concluded 
that the organization of Bell’s yellow pages was copyrightable, the 11th Circuit ultimately 
held otherwise. 
83 Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004); New York 
Mercantile Exchange v. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., 2004 WL 1494383 (SDNY 30 
June 2004). 
84  708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
85  326 US 1 (1945). For a full analysis of the case, see Hovenkamp, Herb (1995), ‘Exclusive 
Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy’, Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 1. 
86  Areeda and Hovenkamp (supra Note 31) note that the case did not hold that AP must open 
its network to all comers, just that it couldn’t discriminate against newspapers that 
competed with existing members (3A Antitrust Law ¶ 772b2). While this is a point of 
distinction from the typical essential facilities case, the nondiscrimination obligation the 
Court did impose is certainly outside the realm of normal antitrust rules. 
87  To similar effect are Drinkwine v. Federated Publications, Inc., 780 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 
1985) and TV Communications Network v. Turner Network Television, 964 F.2d 1022 (10th 
Cir. 1992). In both cases the court rejected claims that a copyright owner controlled an 
essential facility – an advertising tabloid in Drinkwine and a TV network in TV 
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Communications. But both cases reject the claim on the antitrust merits, for failure to 
prove market power, without mentioning the fact that the defendants in both cases produce 
copyrighted works. 
 One case has permitted an essential facilities theory to survive a motion to dismiss without 
discussing the copyrighted works that were doubtless involved in the case. In In re Evic 
Class Action Litig., 2002 WL 1766554 (SDNY 31 July 2002), the court held that the 
plaintiffs stated an antitrust claim that UPS forms and tracking software were essential 
facilities to third parties who sought to compete with UPS in providing ‘excess value’ 
insurance for packages shipped by UPS. The UPS forms and software in question are 
doubtless copyrighted, though the court makes no mention of the fact. Nonetheless, this 
may be a case (like MCI) in which the copyrighted works are only incidental to the control 
of the facility itself, particularly since copyright law does not forbid the creation of 
interoperable programs. 
88  Of course, in such a case the plaintiff will still have to meet the extremely high standards 
for making out an essential facilities claim. The circumstances in which it will be able to 
do so are extremely rare. 
89  Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000). 
90  Id.; see also Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738 
(SDNY 2000). 
91  See Section III.C.2. 
92 540 US 398 (2004). 
93  For good discussions of refusals to license intellectual property as antitrust violations, see 
e.g. Donahey, Teague I. (2000), ‘At the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property: 
Lessons from Intergraph v. Intel and CSU v. Xerox’, Fed. Cir. Bar J., 10, 129; Hayter, 
Dana W. (1996), ‘When a License is Worse than a Refusal: A Comparative Competitive 
Effects Standard to Judge Restrictions in Intellectual Property Licenses’, Berkeley Tech. 
L.J., 11, 281; Kaufmann, Michael H. (1999), ‘Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co.: Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling Intellectual 
Property Rights and Antitrust Liability’, Wake Forest L. Rev., 34, 471; Lao, Marina 
(1999), ‘Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty 
to Deal’, Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y, 9, 193; McGowan, David (1999), ‘Networks and 
Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property’, J. Corp. L., 24, 485; Vermut, Richard S. 
(1997), ‘A Synthesis of the Intellectual Property and Antitrust Laws: A Look at Refusals to 
License Computer Software’, Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts, 22, 27. 
94  See Section II.C. 
95  For a general discussion, see Antitrust Law (supra Note 31), 3A, ¶ 770. 
96  We discuss such cases in Section III.F. 
97  See e.g. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 US 143 (1951). 
98  See Section II. 
99  See e.g. Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (market power 
conferred by IP rights cannot violate the antitrust laws; ‘the patent right must be coupled 
with violations of §2’). 
100  195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
101  See Section III.C.2. 
102  195 F.3d at 1358 (citations omitted). 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 1358–59. The court made no specific reference to Intel’s patents as a factor in this 
decision, despite the district court’s determination that Intel had used its patents to restrain 
trade, and that its patent rights did not immunize it from antitrust liability. See Intergraph 
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 1998). 
105  203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (referred to herein as Xerox). To the extent it is relevant, 
HH was consulted by the defendants in this case. 
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106  Id. at 1326. Curiously, for this proposition the court quoted Image Technical Servs. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), discussed below, which is itself the one 
case that arguably does impose such liability. 
107  Id. at 1327 (emphasis in original). See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 
F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (extending patent rights beyond the scope of the grant 
violates the antitrust laws). 
108  Id. at 1328. 
109  Id. at 1327. 
110  See Miller Insituform Inc. v. Insituform of North Am., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(‘A patent hold who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by refusing to 
license the patent to others.’); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 
1981) (‘where a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under 
the patent laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws.’). 
111  203 F.3d at 1328–29. 
112  36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). 
113  Id. at 1184. 
114  Id. at 1185–86. See also Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 957 F.2d 765, 
767–69 (evaluating the reasonableness of a copyright owner’s refusal to license telephone 
white pages). 
115  Id. at 1187. The court continued in a footnote: ‘Wary of undermining the Sherman Act, 
however, we do not hold that an antitrust plaintiff can never rebut this presumption, for 
there may be rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the 
objectives of the Copyright Act.’ Id. n.64. 
 To similar effect is Corsearch v. Thomson & Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305, 323 (SDNY 
1992) (noting in dictum that the enforcement of a copyright was a presumptively valid 
business justification for a refusal to license). 
116  Id. at 1188–89. 
117  Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1329. Curiously, an earlier 9th Circuit case had held with little 
discussion that a computer hardware manufacturer that owned a copyright in maintenance 
software was free to refuse to provide that software to ISOs, a result that suggests an even 
stronger presumption than Data General’s. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express 
Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Advanced Computer Service v. MAI Sys. Corp., 
845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same). 
118  125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). To the extent it is relevant, HH was consulted by the 
defendants in this case. 
119  Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 US 451 (1992). 
120  125 F.3d at 1220. 
121  Id. at 1215. 
122  Id. at 1216. 
123  Id. at 1216–17. 
124  Id. at 1218. 
125  The district court did not consider this issue at all, and did not give any instruction to the 
jury regarding a presumption based on ownership of intellectual property rights. While the 
Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in failing to give such an instruction, it found 
that the court’s error was harmless because the facts of the case rebutted the presumption. 
Id. at 1218–19. 
126  The evidence of this is pretty clear; Kodak’s own employees testified that intellectual 
property rights had nothing to do with their decision to cut off the ISOs. Id. at 1219–20. 
We discuss the relevance of this evidence in Section III.D.4.a. 
127  Id. at 1219. 
128  Id. at 1217.  
129  One court that recognized the rather stark change in the law wrought by Xerox is 
Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Comms., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 
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1368–69 (N.D. Ga. 2000). That court reversed its prior decision, concluding that after 
Xerox independent service organizations could not bring an antitrust claim based on an 
effort to leverage power from the parts market into the service market. Ironically, while the 
Telecomm court rendered its decision based on its belief that Federal Circuit law was 
controlling, on appeal the Federal Circuit ordered the case transferred to the Eleventh 
Circuit because of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Holmes v. Vornado, 535 
US 826 (2002). Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Comms., Inc., 295 
F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
130  In light of the different opinions, antitrust defendants may be expected to file patent 
infringement claims wherever possible in order to vest jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit, 
with its more lenient rules. While the Federal Circuit is likely to hear most of the patent-
related antitrust cases in the future, and has asserted authority over the antitrust rules to be 
applied in such cases, that does not ameliorate the conflict problem. First, there is a clear 
conflict between the circuits in their treatment of copyright issues. Second, not all patent 
issues will be appealed to the Federal Circuit, both because some antitrust cases (like 
Image Technical) do not involve patent infringement claims by either side, and because in 
an important subset of patent-antitrust cases – those brought by federal or state agencies – 
the case will not involve direct patent issues and will not be appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.  
131  203 F.3d at 1324. 
132  See Section III.D.3. 
133  See e.g. Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union Telegraph, 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
134  It is not clear why this is. Image Technical originally involved both tying and 
monopolization claims, but only the monopolization claim went to the jury. 
135  203 F.3d at 1327. 
136  As noted above, the Federal Circuit in Xerox adopted the First Circuit approach for 
copyrights. 203 F.3d at 1328–29. 
137  By referring to these costs, we intend to encompass not only the increased costs of 
litigation, but any reduction in innovation incentive attributable to the more uncertain 
status of intellectual property rights. 
138  See in particular Sections III.E to III.G. 
139  472 US 585 (1985). The case is discussed in much more detail in Antitrust Law (supra 
Note 31), 3A, ¶ 772c. 
140  472 US at 585. 
141  Id. at 601. 
142  Id. at 602–03. 
143  Cf. Hovenkamp, Herbert (2000), ‘The Monopolization Offense’, Ohio St. L.J., 61, 1035, at 
pp. 1044–45 (Aspen is ‘problematic to say the least’). 
144 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004). 
145  See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996) (limiting 
Aspen to continuations of existing ventures). Cf. Antitrust Law (supra Note 31), 3A, ¶ 
772c3 (‘We would at the very least restrict Aspen to circumstances where the defendant 
terminated an existing joint venture without justification . . .’). 
146  504 US 451 (1992). 
147  As noted above, on remand Kodak did ultimately assert patents and copyrights. 
148  36 F.3d at 1188. 
149  United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines 
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, § 2.3. 
150  On the importance of the focus on the scope of intellectual property rights, see generally 
Bowman, Ward S. Jr. (1973), Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal And Economic Appraisal; 
Barton, John H. (1997), ‘Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth 
and Sequential Innovation’, Antitrust L.J., 65, 449. 
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151  Xerox, Kodak, and Data General all involved patents or copyrights. One court has held 
that the irrebuttable Xerox presumption that a unilateral refusal to deal cannot be unlawful 
does not extend to trade secrets. Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm 
Comms., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2000). While the court was concerned 
that the broad range of protectable trade secrets would mean that ‘virtually every 
anticompetitive refusal to deal would be beyond reach of antitrust law’, we are not 
convinced that trade secrets should be treated differently than other forms of intellectual 
property. Indeed, there are good reasons to permit trade secret owners (and trademark 
owners, though no court has addressed it) to refuse to license their rights, since the 
continued existence of both trade secret and trademark rights will depend in part on how 
licensees behave. 
 The key to avoiding too broad a rule is to determine whether the power exercised is within 
the legitimate scope of the intellectual property right. While entitlement to trade secret 
protection is broad, that protection is significantly less powerful than patent protection, 
limiting the effect of permitting unilateral refusals to deal in trade secrets.  
152  A separate question is presented when intellectual property enforcement litigation is itself 
claimed to violate the antitrust laws. The filing of a lawsuit triggers Noerr-Pennington 
immunity in most circumstances. (See Chapter 11 of IP and Antitrust, supra Note 1.) In 
this case, however, we deal only with antitrust liability based on refusal to license or 
provide access to information.  
153  To the extent it is relevant, HH and ML were both consultants for the federal government 
on this case. 
154  1998 WL 614485 (DDC Sept. 14, 1998) 
155  Id. at *15 (some citations omitted). 
156  United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (DDC 2000). 
157  The court also discussed Microsoft’s intent in imposing the restrictions. Properly read, we 
think the court’s discussion of intent is relevant only to the underlying Section 2 claim, and 
not to whether the intellectual property presumption has been rebutted. There is no 
indication in the opinion that the court intended to take sides in the Image Technical–Xerox 
debate discussed above. 
158  Such efforts are quite common, particularly in the software industry. Software vendors 
regularly include terms in their licenses purporting to bind licensees to rules more 
restrictive than those imposed by copyright law. For examples of such terms, see Lemley, 
Mark A. (1999), ‘Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property 
Licensing’, Calif. L. Rev., 87, 111, at pp.124–136. 
159  See e.g. Feist Pubs. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 US 340 (1991), Baker v. Selden, 101 US 99 
(1880), 17 USC § 102(b). 
160  17 USC §106. 
161  17 USC §107. 
162  See e.g. 17 USC § 111 (cable retransmissions), § 112(e) (digital music sound recordings), 
§ 115 (cover license for musical compositions), § 116 (jukeboxes), § 118 (public 
broadcasting), § 119 (satellite broadcast retransmissions). 
163  35 USC §271(a). 
164  See e.g. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 US 241, 249 (1942); Glass Equip. Dev. v. 
Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
165  See e.g. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 US 537, 562 (1898); Scripps 
Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
166  Accordingly, we think the court in Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm 
Comms., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000) read Xerox too broadly. The 
court concluded that under Xerox a patent on parts necessarily included within its scope the 
right to control service using those parts. This is not correct as a matter of patent law, 
where the scope of a patent depends on its particular claims. The preferable approach is to 
ask whether a restrictive license imposed a condition outside the scope of the particular 
patent. If so, Xerox should not apply. 
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167  See e.g. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 US 386, 432–33 (1945); Scherer, F. M. 
(1977), ‘The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing’, in Monograph Series in 
Finance and Economics , at p. 47 (N.Y.U. Graduate Sch. Bus. Admin. Center for Study 
Fin. Inst. Monograph 1977-2, 1977) (documenting cases of compulsory licensing as an 
antitrust remedy). 
168  Thus, in United States v. Microsoft, it is important to distinguish between the 
government’s claims that Microsoft violated the antitrust laws by refusing to allow 
modifications to Windows 98 and the government’s request for compelled disclosure of 
source code or applications program interfaces as an antitrust remedy. The former is within 
the scope of this chapter, and is discussed in Section III.E; the latter is outside the scope of 
this chapter. 
169  We discuss those issues in more detail in Chapter 6 of IP and Antitrust (supra Note 1). 
170  For a general discussion of this distinction, see 6 Antitrust Law (supra Note 31), vol. 6, ¶ 
1402. 
171  See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., 395 US 100, 135 (1969) (concerted refusal to 
license patents was illegal, even if unilateral refusals would not have been). 
172  In our treatise (supra Note 1), we discuss tying arrangements in Chapters 21–22, patent 
pools and cross-licenses in Chapters 31, 33 and 34, grantback clauses in Chapter 25, and 
field of use restrictions in Chapter 24. 
173  203 F.3d at 1325. 
174  Id. at 1327. 
175 See, e.g., Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1218 (discussing unilateral refusals to license). 
176  We discuss Walker Process and sham litigation in detail in Chapter 11 of IP and Antitrust 
(supra Note 1). 
177  203 F.3d at 1327 (emphasis in original); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 
897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (‘a patent owner may not take the property right 
granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. 
beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.’). 
178  203 F.3d at 1327. 
179 2000-1 Trade Cas. ¶72,890 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
180 We agree with David McGowan’s reading of the situation: 
 The Federal Circuit’s recent [Xerox] decision . . . is best read as affirming the 
distinction between simple and conditional refusals. . . . [T]he exception the Federal 
Circuit explicitly recognized for tying arrangements includes conditional agreements 
that have the same possible economic effects – extending the economic power of a 
patent beyond the scope of the patent grant. 
 David McGowan (2001), ‘Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law’, 
Berkeley Tech. L.J., 16 (2), 729–811 (also noting that a reading limited to tying cases 
‘would make little economic sense’). 
181 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 US 451, 480 n.29 (1992). The Court has 
drawn the same line in the copyright context. See United States v. Loew’s, 371 US 38, 47–
48 (1962). 
182 A somewhat broader statement of the conditional refusal – unilateral conduct distinction is 
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